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Introduction 
This is where God in His infmite wisdom "planted" me and this is 
where I intend to live. I will travel and come back. I do not think one 
has the right to go somewhere else where somebody else has cleaned 
it up. I think this is where the work is, and this is where I shall be .... 
Chinua Achebe 
Nigeria, like the rest of Africa, is still finding its way. It is easy to 
forget that we are trying to do in a matter of decades what it took the 
Western world centuries to do. Perhaps at the moment we are not doing 
it so well, but at least we are doing it ourselves --and, as you can see, 
not without the ability to recognize some of our shortcomings ....( 1) 
Onyeka Onwenu 
The former was Chinua Achebe's response when the latter queried him as to 
why a scholar of his intellectual stature should live in Nigeria, absorbing its 
hardship, while many of his compatriots were in the West and elsewhere basking 
in their intellectual glory and prestige. 
Nigeria, a former British colony, became independent in 1960. In 1963, it 
became a republic and in 1966, the military intervened. The period from 
1963-1966 is referred to as the First Republic. Between 1966 and 1979, the 
country went through a civil war (1967-1970) and during that time partisan 
politics wasmcomatose." From 1979-1983, there was a rebirth of participatory 
democracy in what has been termed the Second Republic. In December 1983, 
the Second Republic "died" following a military coup. The military has reigned 
since 1984, and now plans to transfer political power to a civilian-elected 
president in 1992, in what has been dubbed the Third Republic. 
Nigeria's three decades of independence have been fraught with turbulence as 
a result of economic, social and political distemper. These have left many in 
continuous bewilderment as to when it would become politically stable. Yet, 
Nigerians at home and in the diaspora have continued to celebrate its 
independence day with optimism. This may be a reassuring sign that in spite of 
its shortcomings, many Nigerians still have great faith in the country's ability 
to overcome its difficulties. 
Stressing the causes of the political instability of Nigeria since its inception as 
a sovereign state, while significant, is not the purpose of this paper, for they 
have been superbly dealt with elsewhere.(;?) Rather, it is a .  attempt to suggest 
and analyze a couple of remedies and strategies for dealing with the issues of 
participatory democracy (including freedom of the press, etc) and stability( 
which implies the absence of military intervention and the need for law makers 
to adhere to the constitution) in Nigeria in 1992 and after --a task that is both 
difficult and daunting. Be that as it may, I would like to argue that it demands 
a bipartite cooperation between and among "movers" of the polity- i.e., the 
military and civilians (technocrats, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, labor, and 
academicians, etc). In this regard, the pursuit of the national interest (not 
individual, group, class, state or government interests) should be the most 
fundamental objective and melding factor among these cleavages in the Federal 
Republic. 
J. Isawa Elaigwu has noted that, "for a long time to come,the socio-political 
and economic factors which made the federal government a political imperative 
will continue to task the capabilities of Nigeria's leade rs.... Nigeria needs 
1eadersImilitary and civilians] imbued with a high sense of nationalism, 
foresight, dedication, integrity, patience, accommodation and fairness." (3) 
These are admirable qualities that only a relative few are able to imbibe because 
of the often conflicting and some-times antagonistic individual and group 
interests. As Rene Dumont has noted: "It has become increasingly clear that 
there has indeed been a false start in Africa. It is a false start, which is part of 
the legacy from Africa's colonial past.. . .There has been a false start, too, by the 
academicians in their efforts to speak meaningfully to each other aod to Africa's 
law makers. "(4) 
In fact, it might be argued that in order for democracy to blossom in Nigeria 
and political stability to be sustained, it would take the mutual efforts of the 
military and civilians. Nigeria may have to borrow from the advanced societies 
those factors that enhance the development of democracy in the country. These 
factors may then be combined with traditional ones. In this sense, the country 
would adopt a strategy that the Chinese have sometimes referred to as the policy 
of "walking-on-two-legs."(S) This implies that Nigeria must maintain its 
traditional values while absorbing those foreign values (tolerance, magnanimity 
in political victory, etc) that may be conducive to the Nigerian political culture. 
However, the problems of democracy and political stability have been viewed 
by many from the historical perspective. Some scholars have argued that it 
would be foolhardy to address today's problems without alluding to the past. 
After all, they argue, it was the problems of yesterday that metamorphosed into 
the problems of today, and that today's problems are likely to give birth to 
tomnow's problems.(6) Some of these scholars have expressed profound 
pessimism concerning the future of democracy and stability in Nigeria in light 
of the manner of the transition of power from the military to civilians. Indeed, 
some have already eulogized the "death" of the Third Republic in professional 
journals(7) and in national and international fora.(8) Moreover, the intensity 
and frankness with which some observers have argued their case against the 
mechanisms for implementing the Third Republic appear convincing and thus 
disturbing. One of such issues was the open ballot system.(9) 
The Open Ballot System 
The open ballot system is an electoral system which involves the electorates 
queuing up in front of the portrait of the candidate of their choice so that they 
could be visibly seen and counted by the electoral officers. This system 
superseded the secret ballot system used in previous elections, which allowed the 
voters to secretly cast their votes for the candidate of their choice. 
The argument for the open ballot system, noted Humphrey Nwosu, chairman 
of the National Electoral Commission(NEC), stemmed from the assumption that 
it represented the "most indigenous, simple, cost-effective and credible system 
since it gave no room for any form of rigging and dubious intentions [to win an 
election]."(lO) Elsewhere, he contended that "in an ideal situation, the secret 
ballot could be used but Nigeria is not facing an ideal situation."(ll) 
However,one could argue that if the system is indigenous, as  he suggested,ipso 
facto, it should be ideal to the country. Such seemingly contradictory 
assumptions and apologia illustrate the complexity in Nigeria's democratic 
experiment. The problems in melding traditional political norms and bobowed 
political systems are enormous. This is especially so because the acceptance of 
indigenous social and political patterns require attitudinal adjustments on the part 
of those who are more likely to support or oppose the local system.For example, 
Oyeleye Oyediran (a member of the Nigerian constitutional drafting committee) 
expressed his concern regarding the issue of the open ballot system. This 
system, according to him, would deny the electorates the right to secrecy-one 
of the fundamental tenets of democracy. He, then, wondered how the NEC 
could argue that such a practice would further democracy. (12) 
While this debate rages on, the efficaciousness of the open ballot system 
cannot be fully measured until well after 1992. Suffice it to say that the system 
appears to have a number of converts. Indeed, following the december 1990 
local elections, Baba Kingibe, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) was alleged not only to be in support of the open ballot system but to 
have said that, "open ballot system will in a short while constitute Africa's 
major contribution to democracy."(l3) He further claimed that the open ballot 
system would benefit the millions of SDP sympathizers who understood better 
the unusual style of exercising their franchise.(l4) 
By way of comparison, in Kenya where the open ballot system was adopted, 
the results have been mixed. Indeed, it appears that the system will be 
eliminated as part of the political changes the people desire.(lS) That it had 
mixed reviews in Kenya should not imply that it would be ineffective in the case 
of Nigeria. 
The issue is not whether the open ballot system is effective or ineffective in 
Nigeria's quest for political stability.The concern is whether the people will be 
patient enough to accept it as part of the nation's(l6) democratic experiment. 
For instance,are the political parties truly "wedded" to the idea of the open 
ballot system such that if their party failed to win, they would not blame their 
defeat on the system? In other words, are the parties capable of convincing their 
followers and backers that if they lose, the open ballot system will not become 
the scapegoat and thus withhold their support for the winning party? Does the 
system have the grassroots support? 
Some advocates of the system contend that "the past experience whereby ballot 
papers, camouflaged as pregnancies were later stuffed into ballot boxes by 
unscmpulous party stalwarts makes the open ballot formula appealing."(l7) 
President Ibrahim Babangida, throwing his weight in support of the system said: 
"The whole process of elections is about political choices, and whatever will 
make Nigerians to choose the right people to represent them, we will go for 
that. Our problems in the past have been the secret ballot and ballot papers and 
we want to make sure that this problem does not persist in our national life."(l8) 
Although the two parties (legally sanctioned by the military to compete for the 
apparatus of government and power), the Nigerian Republican Convention 
(NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) appear to be in favor of the open 
ballot system, they have done so with preconditions. For example, the SDP 
insists that polling booths must not be located near churches, mosques, and in 
h n t  of the homes of influential people. The NRC, on the other hand, favors a 
modification of the open ballot system. It is in favor of what it refers to as the 
"open-secret" ballot system. The party explained that, "this had all the qualities 
of the open ballot with the exception that the thumb printing and sealing of the 
ballot paper is done in secret, while the voter drops a paper in a box placed 
outside for all to see. "(19) 
The foregoing positions of the parties suggest that they are not fully in sync 
regarding the open ballot system.This does not mean that their positions are 
unbridgeable. What is important is that they must seek the consent and support 
of the grasstoots electorate if the democratic experiment is to have any validity. 
If successhl, the process of socializing the people regarding its efficacy must 
continue unabated after 1992. 
The Governing Process 
Electing political candidates to govern a polity is one thing, however, and the 
ability of the legislators to adequately govern is another. In other words, are the 
governors able to use the existing or modified political structures and institutions 
to govern effectively? Some critics believe that the Third Republic might end up 
just as the second did because the "new breed" politicians have not learned a 
lesson from the past. They are just not fully adjusted to the new political 
structure. Certainly, the concerns raised by these observers and scholars are 
well founded. Thus, this is the time to seek out solutions -- the kind that Larry 
Diamond has pointed out with respect to successful governing. He underscored 
among other factors: (a) Accountability of rulers to the ruled; (b) Pluralism in 
social, political, and economic life, involving dispersal of resources and 
competition between ideas and preferences; (c) Checks and balances to prevent 
the accumulation and abuse of power.. .(20) Adjusting to these solutions will not 
be easy. In fact, conflicting interpretations of these dimensions by the political 
parties may have led to the political chaos and demise of the Second 
Republic.Nonetheless, they are significant and should be viewed positively by 
future lawmakers. It is a fact that the Nigerian polity like others will continue 
to go through trials and tribulations, but as Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovakia's 
president once noted rather poignantly, "We would be cursed by future 
generations [if the country's major problems such as democracy and stability are 
not resolved]. " (21) 
In addition, such centrifugal religious and ethnic tendencies that sometimes 
warp the politics of the nation must be dealt with in order to prepare Nigeria for 
the future generations. But how must the country go about it? Ali Mami has 
contended allegorically with respect to the nation-state that "if married couples 
continued to recall past altercations [and how they may have mutually traded 
insults at each other's family members], such a relationship would be headed 
toward doom. "(22) Conflicts are natural in any political system. The question 
is to what extent is the political system capable of managing its conflicts to 
prevent it from becoming ungovernable? Accentuating the positive and 
de-emphasizing the negative might be one way of assuaging the pessimism and 
cynicism that have become commonplace in the Nigerian polity following the 
post-oil boom era. I contend that in order for a nation to be stable and advance 
courageously in the face of difficulties, the people must feel good about 
themselves or at least feel that the opportunities are there for them to improve 
themselves. And in the words of the American civil rights leader, Jesse Jackson, 
are the opportunities there to "keep hope alive?" If and when such a sense of 
hope is promoted by the system, the people are likely to support the gove'rnment 
and this could then further stability. 
The Role of Scholars 
To come back to one of the central themes of this essay, it is a given that 
scholars interested in Nigerian affairs are aware of the problems confronting the 
nation and indeed so much has been writ-ten by so many on the subject.(23) But 
my position as I have argued earlier on must be to shift our foci from the 
problem areas to providing solutions. In fact, I contend that if collective efforts 
are made especially by the academicians to pursue the problem-solving goal with 
the same intellectual vigor that they have asserted and explained the difficulties 
confronting the country, the task of resolving Nigeria's political imbroglios 
would probably be assured. And through political socialization, the process may 
even be furthered. In this approach, it may be worthwhile to state that such 
collective strategies should be devoid of the philosopher-king approach. Put 
another way, the problem-solving technique applied by scholars should avoid 
what I would like to refer to as "myopic syndrome," - i.e., the assumption on 
the part of some that their views are sacrosanct. Perhaps, it would be imperative 
to adopt what Charles McClelland described as the "wisdom outlook." That is, 
"the notion that no one man can understand the sweep of [Nigeria's problems] 
but that many specialists, each working in his [or her] own sphere, together 
have such knowledge." (24) In other words, it assumes that no one individual 
has a "finite" knowledge of the country's problems. In a nutshell, the 
quintessential dimension of my argument is that the national interest should 
supersede the provincial and parochial interests of the different publics. Thus, 
as critical political observers (no matter the political and ideological persuasion) 
efforts and analysis should be directed toward furthering "nucleotic" allegiance, 
(25) i.e., political allegiance directed toward the nation-state as opposed to 
, "cytoplasmic" or geo-ethnic allegiance.(26) Shifting allegiance to the central 
government is a sinequa-non for successful governing in Nigeria as Claude Ake 
has eloquently noted elsewhere.(27) This could be done if the mechanisms for 
doing so are available. I suggest political education and intend to pursue this 
matter later on in the essay. 
Now that it appears that the Third Republic is likely to fail as Agbase,(28) 
Akinola,(29) Ihonvbere,(30) Uwaruike(31) and others have suggested, what must 
be done to rectify it? Put another way, what should scholars, politicians and 
others interested in democracy and the political stability of the country do to 
avoid the conditions that might lead to the collapse of the forthcoming republic 
and perhaps others to follow in the future? This remains one of the central foci 
of this paper. 
Some Possible Solutions 
Here, I will attempt to offer two unrelated and probably simplistic solutions. 
I contend that sometimes "intellectual" solutions are confusing even .to the 
informed public, let alone the massive, "poor," illiterate Nigerians for whom 
scholars have so craftily designed their solutions. As with most solutions to a 
problem, there is always the issue of implementation. 
My first solution deals with the "immediate" issues facing the nation, i.e., the 
present electoral process leading to the presidential election in 1992. The 
second is a long-term solution to the issue of democracy; that is assuming it is 
the determined road and direction the country wishes to travel. 
As to the former, the pessimistic prognosis issued by many scholars and 
politicians regarding the success of the Third Republic stems from the political 
behavior patterns of many Nigerians both during the pre-and post-independence 
eras.(32) A discussion of the political culture during these periods is not within 
the purview of this essay. Suffice it to say, however, that in the politics of the 
nation, the struggle for power in the classical Laswellian tradition (of who gets 
what, when and how) has tended to pit families against families; not to mention 
enemies against enemies. Claude Ake has noted, =inter alia that in the 
Nigerian politics: 
... A willingness to violate the legitimate methods of contestation [is 
applied], if necessary, to achieve the goal of power. The break down 
of constitutional norms, in the context of a high premium on power, in 
turn generates a high level of political anxiety ... merefore], a 
desperate struggle to win control of state power ensues since the control 
means for all practical purposes being all powerful and owning 
everything. Politics becomes warfare.. .[to which the winner is entitled 
to the spoils of the political battle].(33) 
In such battles between political parties, it is the nation-state that has often 
suffered from the obfuscation of democracy caused by the ubiquitous military 
regimes. Nigeria is by no means unique on this issue. The major problem, 
however, is that after the battle is lost or won, the process of reconciliation that 
must follow has tended to be nonexistent. Where reconciliation has existed, it 
has sometimes been so slow that by the time of the succeeding elections, old 
political wounds become recrudescent; a condition that often revives the problem 
of geoethnic angst. But this should not be the case for Nigerians have been 
known to be magnanimous in victory. This was an observation that Ali M m i  
made succinctly in =The Africans (34), and elsewhere.(35) For example, when 
the civil war came to an end in 1970, General Gowan received a group of 
"Biafrans" who had come to surrender by embracing them as brothers [and 
wishing the war had never taken place].(36) The reconciliation that followed has 
been described by some as Lincohesque, in reference to the reconciliation 
between the north and south following the end of the American Civil War of the 
1860's. 
If Nigerians could be as conciliatory in a war that claimed the lives of 
thousands, perhaps millions, why can't Nigerians be equally magnanimous in 
political victory? Larry Diamond has argued that political cleavages "need time 
not only to develop their organizational structures and political identities, but 
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also to build relationships of mutual tolerance and trust with one another; only 
in this way can there be developed the confidence that defeat will not mean 
political death and victory will be tempered by magnanimity. "(37)Such a system 
of "mutual security," contends Robert Dahl, "can only grow gradually over 
many years and several elections. "(38) Perhaps what is politically soothing 
in the Nigerian case as it goes through the present political metamorphoses is the 
shift from the somewhat zero-sum-game of the parliamentary system to the 
variable-sum-game of the presidential system in which the parties come out with 
some benefits. And if this is the political road that Nigeria wishes to traverse, 
it is incumbent on the nation to commence without delay to educate the 
grassmots about its virtues. In addition, political parties should stress national 
issues that benefit everyone irrespective of their ideologies. This, it has been 
suggested elsewhere, may induce political losers to confer legitimacy on the 
political party in power(39) and thus encourage what Bolaji Akinyemi described 
as maximal unity- a transference of loyalties from sub-national primordial units 
to one of the nation-state.(40) 
So far, the discussion has centered on the assumption that in spite of the 
shortcomings of the post-independence political history of Nigeria, there was 
need for the country to create conditions for optimism and to capitalize on the 
nation's accomplishments past and present in hopes that they would help to 
rekindle a sense of national pride and nationalism. Probably, a good case in 
point would be Nigeria's African policy, which, taking all in all, was quite 
positive. 
For example, Falola and Ihonvbere have noted, that "the intensification of 
Nigeria's role in the OAU, the United Nations,the Non-aligned movement, the 
group of 77 and the ... activity against racial discrimination and colonialism, 
increased material and diplomatic support for liberation movements and the 
creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are 
evidence of [the desired goals] to win friends within the OAU and to emerge as 
Africa's spokes country."(41) In this regard, Nigeria used its oil wealth to 
pursue the country's interest within the African continent and elsewhere. It is not 
unusual for nation-states to bask in their past glories with a view to persuading 
its people that through hard work such glorious times may very well come 
again. Nigeria should be able to use such accomplishments to revive the spirit 
of nationalism -the kind that was popular and commonplace in the late 70's and 
early 80's when the country was relatively wealthy as a result of the abundance 
of "petro dollars." 
Dealing with the issues of Corruption, Fraud 
Two other relational areas of concern as Nigerians march toward civilian rule 
in 1992 and thereafter are the questions of electoral fraud and corruption which 
are rampant in the struggle for power. These factors have impugned the outcome 
of previous elections and the concept of democracy in the country. Electoral 
fraud remains a major bane in the nation's search for democracy and stability; 
a condition that is exacerbated by the ubiquitous nature of corruption. 
An examination of extant literature on corruption is replete with various 
analyses of the causes and effects of corruption. For example, Gerald Caiden 
argues that scarcity breeds corruption and thatmevery society exhibits certain 
features that encourage and foster official misconduct.. . .Unless they are tackled, 
cormption is likely to persist. "(42) The sociologist, Varda Eker, affirms that the 
"term[cormption] is usually reserved for the practice of using the power of 
office for making private gain in breach of laws and regulations nominally in 
force.. . "(43) 
Elsewhere, G. E. Caiden and N. J. Caiden have argued thatWaltbough the 
public's perception about corruption in developing countries are likely to be 
wholly negative, most of the existing scholarly literature on the subject tends to 
take the opposite view ... "(44)Thus, the economist, M. Shahid Alam, alluding 
to the work of the functionalist, D. H. Bayley asserts rather poignantly that 
cormption in developing countries plays a "role which is sufficiently important 
that if it was not played by this device must be played by another.. . "(45) 
How, therefore, are these perplexing analyses related to the Nigerian case? In 
his New Year speech to the nation following the overthrow of the Second 
Republic, General Buhari stated the reasons for the military coup as follows: 
While cormption and in discipline had been associated with our state 
of underdevelopment, these twin evils in our politics have attained 
unprecedented height over the past four years. The corrupt, inept and 
insensitive leadership in the last four years has been the source of 
immorality and impropriety in our society, since what happens in any 
society is largely a reflection of the leadership of that society.(46) 
When Buhari's major assertions are juxtaposed against those of Major 
Chukwuma Nzeogwu, the leader of the January 1966 coup, one sees some 
parallels as to the causes of both coups. For instance, Nzeogwu said after the 
coup: 
Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in high and 
low places who seek bribes and demand ten percent, those that seek to 
keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office 
as minister and VIP's of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists ....( 47) 
What does this comparison betoken? It betoken's the fact that 
fraud and corruption have become endemic in the society. Perhaps 
through socialization they have become "acceptable" norms given the longevity 
of their practice in the system. Any attempt to stop it,while not impossible, is 
difficult because it will meet with resistance even from "high" places. Thus, the 
issue, then, is how to control it. 
Indeed, that Nigerians do not have a monopoly on corruption is a known fact, 
and stressing the issue as many scholars have rightfully done would be 
tantamount to flogging a dead horse. Instead,I would like to argue that as far as 
humankind was concerned, corruption was and is semper et ubique0--it is 
instinctive. (48) 
Arthur Nzeribe takes umbrage on this view. In his diatribe on corruption in 
Nigeria, he stated emphatically that "while ethical and moral values are an 
integral element of the human beiig as God's creation, and while the 250 ethnic 
groups in the federation of Nigeria may have numerous variants of the same 
ethical and moral injunction, there is still little doubt or dispute that all Nigerian 
ethnic groups, big and small cherish certain universal moral values." (49) 
He further suggests that corruption was probably a learned behavior in most 
societies and not a "genetic" characteristic.So, he argues: "What one can say for 
Western societies in this regard is that through decades, and in some cases 
centuries, of observance of their tradition and culture, bolstered by education 
and enlightened legislation, there has emerged a political culture which has more 
vigorously implemented the demands of ethics and morality in public office and 
public conduct than perhaps has been the case in our society. "(50) 
I view bis former assertion with reservations, noting that "human naturew is 
too complex to assume its "absolute" obedience to God's moral will. One must 
take cognizance of environmental "determinism" or factors that are sometimes 
beyond human control. However, his latter analysis is quite plausible.In fact, I 
would like to argue that if Nigeria applied similar political engineering to its 
system, it too, with patience and prudence might acquire similar characteristics; 
one that is likely to further political stability in the country. 
But when "70% of Nigerian foreign exchange earnings is repatriated out of the 
Nigerian economyR(51) and $33 billion of the nation's wealth is invested in 
foreign banks by Nigerians according to the Morgan Report, (52) those should 
be causes for alarm and the need to control corruption. It should be stressed that 
while not necessarily acquiescing to these occurrences in Nigerian polity, that 
many Nigerians would like such "loots" to be invested in the nation's economy 
to provide jobs. Such jobs could help to further the process of development and 
dernarginalization of the people. Diamond(53) and Ihonvbere(54) have given a 
litany of corrupt practices commonplace in the Nigerian polity. 
However,Diamond notes that.. . "what Nigerians resent is not individual 
wealth[especially that earned in the old fashion way through hard work] per se, 
but the riches that have been garnered at the expense of society, and so have 
failed to improve the standard of living in ordinary people. "(55) 
It is important that Nigerians should be continuously educated through the 
mediums of television, radio and newspapers about the moral, psychological, 
I economic and developmental consideration to invest in the nation. Perhaps, this 
strategy would be efficacious if the nation launched a moral crusade, similar or 
even better than the "intentions" of the policies of War Against Indiscipline 
(WAI). 
I 
I 
Another political dilemma that must be tackled in the electoral process is that 
of political fraud. Indeed, political fraud, especially the rigging of elections has 
been a major disruptive element in Nigerian politics. The use of an open ballot 
system which was discussed earlier has been suggested as a possible remedy. 
Although it has not been hlly tested, it is probably a good start. 
To be sure, if only "men" were angels we would not need a government and 
a priori there would be no political clashes and conflicts. But when one truly 
examines the concept, politics, one sees it to be enamored with conflict. 
I 
Definitionally, politics is described variously as the struggle for power; who gets 
what, when and how; the authoritative allocation of values, et cetera. So, the 
nature of politics itself conjures competition, and when such a competition is for 
the allocation of scarce resources, the battle cry from the political cleavages can 
sometimes be very fierce and the clashes tend to create durable centrihgal 
tendencies.What point am I trying to make here? It is that given the electoral 
conflicts and instability of Nigeria's post-independence political history,a 
maximum attempt should be made to control political violence and its sources 
through "genuine" legal enforcement. 
The Issue of Diarchy 
Some political observers have suggested a system of government known as 
"diarchy" for Nigeria - i.e., a system of government made up of civilians and 
the soldiers as a strategy for avoiding military coups in the country. Indeed, Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, one of the founding fathers of the nation and first president 
of Nigeria has remarked that: 
... not that the military caste is perfect or that civilians are imperfect, 
but that civil rule depends upon the military establishment as a sanction 
for the maintenance and enforcement of the law. Until developing 
nations have had sufficient experience and maturity in handling human 
problems with reason and finesse, and until they have become 
disciplined in their personal lives, community living, and the exercise 
of political rights and privileges.. .incorporating the military hierarchy 
on a more active basis in a civilian-based administration to make it 
stable [is a reasonable proposition].(56) 
It might be argued that military involvement in Nigerian politics has become 
part and parcel of its political culture given the longevity of the military at the 
helm of the Nigerian government. In fact, it might be contended that through the 
process of political socialization many Nigerians, especially the youth,have not 
only resigned themselves to the reality of military intrusion into politics, but 
may have accepted it as the norm. Today, it is possible that many who aspire 
to become head of state have chosen the military as a sure and perhaps quickest 
way to that goal. Thus, it might be wise to incorporate the army into a civilian 
regime, in spite of the sensitivity of many to this proposal and reality. As a 
matter of fact, this dualism already exists, except of course, that the head of 
state has always been a military officer. In a military 
cumcivilian-administration, the head of state and commander-in-chief of the 
d forces would have to be a civilian. Tom Ikimi, the Chairman of the NRC 
was said to have promised that his party would bring the military into his 
government in 1992. However, he refuted the statement and clarified his 
position by stating that, "the NRC govemment wants Nigeria to be a world 
power in a decade and a strong and prosperous nation deserves a strong army. 
I have never said that the army should be part of a civilian democratic 
government." (57) Probably, the alleged statement accredited to Tom Ikimi 
represented a true and honest assessment of the political reality in Nigeria, even 
though the idea may be unpopular among many political elites and analysts. 
Nzribe has suggested that both political parties must have in their manifesto a 
desire to ' promote the general welfare of the Nigerian military. Though not a 
diarchy, the military should be represented both at the state and Federal levels 
of governments, as a means of insulating them from future intervention. "(58) 
This is so, since the military has a monopoly on the instrument of coercion.(59) 
Whereas such a political mamage of convenience between the civilians and 
military should be a temporary measure, I maintain that the decoupling process 
should be delicately implemented. Perhaps in the Machiavellian metaphor, the 
civilians should play the game of the "lion and fox". The soldiers have been in 
power for "too' long and sociologically, old habits diehard, and attitudes tend 
to change incrementally. 
Speaking in Ogbomosho, during the 1983 presidential campaign, president 
Shehu Shagari alluded to the Nigerim democratic experiment(60) - one that 
must take into account Nigeria's political characteristics. Nigeria has traversed 
a long way in its search for a viable democracy and stability. At this stage, 
therefore, Nigerians must take bold measures and attempt to concoct an eclectic 
system that works. Like scientists, the experiments must be carried out in an 
atmosphere of dedication and patience. John Wiseman has argued rather 
eloquently that "democracy will. remain the major path for African countries 
because it reflects the plural nature of African states,"(61) and Nigeria is no 
exception. 
So far, I have looked at some of the political problems con-fronting Nigeria 
and some ways in which to deal with them in the short run. But no amount of 
theorizing would mollify the imbroglio in Nigerian politics. I maintain, 
therefore, that concrete problems require tangible solutions, while 
simultaneously recognizing the fact that there are no quick fixes to endemic 
problems. Chudi Uwazurike has noted that ". . . under third world conditions 
even ostensibly neat models [or paradigms] founder in the face of real life 
struggl es...."(6 2) A country is "doomed" if it does not recognize the fact that 
failures are natural, and that out of the lessons learned from its failures it could 
arise to be a great nation. And, we need not look that far for the history of some 
of the world's greatest democracies are replete with failures. But despite these 
failures they have emerged as great nations today. Nigeria stands at the 
crossroads of joining this exclusive club, given its tremendous but under-utilized 
manpower and perceived regional power status. This view, Andrew Young 
asserted rather succinctly when he said, "Nigeria is in some important respects 
Africa's most powerful nation," (63) probably because of its manpower and 
natural fesources. 
Political Education 
What about the long range strategy for sustaining democracy and stability in 
Nigeria? Analogically, a nation-state is like a car. When it is new, it usually 
runs well and requires little or no maintenance.However, after a couple of years, 
the need for periodic tune-ups becomes imperative to sustain it and prolong its 
life. This analogy leads us to the next question which is how to maintain a well 
fought for and earned democracy. Whereas ideas for this are numerous, various 
and even sometimes contradictory, I would like to suggest political education. 
The assumption here is that education helps to change attitudes and that 
'proper" education could foster the "rightw attitudes. By this strategy, one would 
like to suggest the inclusion of political education into the cumculum at the 
kindergarten up to the high school level. This view is not novel. After all, 
students recite the pledge of allegiance at school and other major gatherings. I 
believe that the kind of political education that the nation should embark upon 
is one that teaches the vdimentary characteristics of democracy and the art of 
'good" government. A good government at the vestigial level may be one that 
stresses the following characteristics: (a) Politics is a variable-sum-game; (b) 
National interest supersedes individual, .parochial, provincial and regional 
interest; (c) Political parties represent national interest, not just party members 
interest;(d) The respect for human rights; (e) Freedom of expression. Such a 
view has been referred to elsewhere as "strategic imperative" for the 
furtherance of the aspiration of the African people. These conditions include the 
following: (a) Responsiveness and efficiency; (b) Trust creation and confidence 
building which must be between the governor and the governed; (c) 
Decentralization of power to the grassroots; (d) Pluralism and de- centralization 
of the economy; (e) Political communications; (f) Education and political 
education; (g) Promotion and defence of human rights; (h) Creation of 
appropriate political machinery; (i) Renewal of mandate and succession 
programme; (j) Popular participation in all aspects of the developmental process. 
(64) 
Whereas the former should serve as a form of political education at the early 
level, the latter should be instituted to help lubricate the political system at all 
levels. It is hoped that this strategy could enhance the activity of the already 
established Center for the Democratic Studies (CDS) which is aimed at 
"nurturing politicians and aspiring politicians democratic values and its 
etiquette. "(65) 
One hopes that the kind of democracy which the nation yearns for is one that 
is not imposed. As many Nigerians have learned a "genuine" and durable 
democracy must be built from down upwards, not from up downwards.(66) It 
must be taught, preached and even prayed for at the grassroots level. Such a 
strategy is likely to further what president Ibrahim Babangida termed 
"demilitarization of Nigerian politics ... while transforming Nigerians from the 
untenable past of destructive politics to one of grassroots democracy,"(67) 
[through early political education]. 
It is a given that most Nigerians and "Nigerianists" (i.e.,scholars interested in 
Nigerian affairs) no matter their political ideology are in favor of a viable 
democratic and stable political system. hideed, many have (in their own special 
ways) been working toward this objective. They only have different tactics for 
attaining the same goal. I suggest that this is one strategy. To delay the process 
to the high school or higher level may be unproductive as some have come to 
learn. (6 8) 
Conclusion 
The late Chief Obafemi Awolowo probably captured what should be-come the 
political focus and attitudes of Nigerian law-makers when he said in regard to 
socialism in Nigeria: "No one nation ever attains a worth-while goal designed 
for the benefit of the entire people in one fell swoop without courting irreparable 
or prolong disaster for the people concerned . . . . "(69) 
Nigeria's quest for democracy and stability will not come easily. It requires 
careful planning and patience. But Nigeria, like many Third World nations, 
suffers from what Albert Hirschman described as "La rage de vouloir conclure" 
(the mania for wanting to be done with it).(70) This assertion assumes .that as 
soon as Third World nations are confronted with failure, the intellectuals call for 
an immediate comprehensive solution to the problem without first mastering all 
I 
of the local problem. Indeed, .sometimes they introduce policy solutions from 
abroad to tackle indigenous problems. These solutions do not always work. 
I 
In the Nigerian case, the open ballot system has been introduced with 
numerous assumptions as to its indigenous validity and efficacy. One major test 
for it was the December 8, 1990 local elections, which was said to be 
successful. Indeed, it was revealed that about 12.5 million people voted. This 
I 
represented approximately 22 per cent of eligible voters. (71) No matter its 
merits or demerits, its outcome should be considered heuristic for now. More 
testing is needed at the grassroots level to determine its effectiveness to produce 
the desired result. 
Although the political parties back the system, it appears that they have done 
so with the assumption that the system would be beneficial to their party, and 
probably not because it is "good" for the country. It has been suggested that "the 
process of psycho-cultural modernization or change within an individual will be 
less disruptive and will endure longer if the person is rewarded substantially for 
having made the shift. "(72) The open ballot system introduces a new equation 
into the nation's political culture and the response of the people to it may rest 
on how they view the system (either as rewarding or non-rewarding) and their 
comprehension of its "genuine" purpose. 
Nigeria's policy makers may come up with strategies, structures and 
institutions to solve the nation's problems, but if they do not deal with the root 
causes of instability their labor will be in vain. For example, the building of 
modern parliaments and other institutions for governing do not solve political 
problems. This was the lesson learned by the unused and ubiquitous parliaments 
in the African continent and else-where. One could only hope that these elegant 
edifices are lying "fallowwas the attitudes of the legislators who are in the 
position to use them are adequately adjusted to take advantage of these modem 
structures and institutions. Political structures alone will not lift any country out 
of its economic and political miasma. Thus, Elizabeth Normandy has argued that 
"more attention should be paid to political attitudes and culture and the role they 
play in Nigeria's political stability. More studies of this much neglected area 
could offset the preponderance of studies on political structure and provide a 
more complete picture of the causes of and remedies for instability."(73) 
Although it remains difficult to study the political attitudes and culture in 
Nigeria because of the fact that the military has been entrenched in the 
governance of the country for so long, the issue is an important one deserving 
major consideration. 
The issues of corruption and electoral fraud are major concerns that the nation 
must address in order to further democracy and stability. To suggest, however, 
that these irregularities in Nigeria's political system will go away in one fell 
swoop is to delude oneself. But it does not mean that they are impossible to 
eradicate. It was to this end that I suggested the need for political education. 
Such an education could enhance what Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have 
termed "the civic culturen- i.e., that balanced set of attitudes toward citizenship 
and politics that helps nourish a democratic, stable and effective nation. (74) In 
all, therefore, "adequate" education helps to change attitudes especially when it 
is aimed at the youth who must govern tomorrow. 
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